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FOREWORD
President Clinton has expressed clear support for greater
U.N. effectiveness in the peaceful resolution of conflict and the
organization of collective security. This entails finding ways to
improve U.N. peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace- enforcement.
The U.S. Army will have a vital role in this process and thus
must better understand both the U.N. itself and the key issues
and questions associated with peace support operations.
The foundation of such understanding is debate on a series
of broad issues such as the macro-level configuration of the
international system, alterations in global values (especially
the notion of sovereignty), and the function of the United
Nations in possible future international systems. While questions
concerning such problems cannot be answered with certainty, they
will serve as the basis for future decisions on doctrine, force
structure, and strategy. It is thus vital for American security
professionals to grapple with them.
To encourage this process, the Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, sponsored a roundtable on October 5, 1993
that brought together distinguished experts from both inside and
outside the government. They included widely-published writers,
analysts, and practitioners of peace operations. Their goal was
less to reach consensus on the future of the U.N. than to agree
on what the vital questions, problems, and issues will be.
The following report is not a verbatim transcript of
discussion at the roundtable, but an attempt to capture the
debate and identify the core issues which emerged. The Strategic
Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a
contribution to the debate on the future of U.N. peace operations
and the role of the United States in them.<R><R><R>

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The roundtable examined grand strategic issues such as the
nature of the future international system and the evolving role
of the United Nations. Discussion was organized around a series
of topics:
The Future of the International System. The participants
generally agreed that the future international system would be
two tiered with most conflict occurring in the second tier. This
will include the emergence of "failed states." They disagreed on:
• The degree of stability and cooperation within the first
tier;
• The extent to which instability and violence in the second
tier can threaten first tier states, especially the United
States;
• The importance of non-state actors in the system;
• The wisdom or feasibility of attempts to reconstruct
failed states.
On the very vital question of when the United States should
become involved in second tier conflicts, a majority of the
participants supported U.S. involvement in second tier conflict-preferably in preemptive, coalition efforts. They did not agree
on coherent strategic criteria for engagement.
The Role of the United Nations. Most participants were
skeptical of expanded U.N. activities. There was a feeling that
the U.N. does traditional peacekeeping activities fairly well,
but would meet with much less success if it attempted to
undertake operations requiring a robust military capability.
Strengthening the U.N.? The roundtable participants offered
a number of suggestions for strengthening the United Nations. It
should focus on the minimum necessary structural, political, and
economic changes to deal effectively and in a timely fashion with
traditional peacekeeping. This would include improvements in
force recruitment, supply of fielded forces, and transportation.
The U.N. should also seek to enhance its "peace building"
capabilities by developing better methods to recruit, train, and
field competent electoral observers, civil administrators, and
civilian police. There should also be a limited planning and
support staff within the U.N. Secretariat and better coordination
between the military and civilian components of peace support
operations. The participants did not favor giving the U.N.
control of large-scale military missions.
The United States and the United Nations. The roundtable
participants generally anticipated a fair degree of compatibility

between U.S. and U.N. objectives, and felt that the U.N. could
play an important role in American national security strategy as
we attempt to avoid a strategic ends/means mismatch. They agreed
that gauging the extent to which we wanted to strengthen the U.N.
was a vital foreign policy decision, but one on which no clear
consensus currently exists. In the future, the United States will
be forced to choose between a U.N. with limited utility which we
control, or a more influential but autonomous organization.
Conclusion: Issues and Questions. All of the participants at
the roundtable were moderates who saw at least some utility in
the United Nations, but none considered it a panacea. There was
deep agreement that most efforts of the U.N. in the promotion of
peace and security would continue to take place in the second
tier of the international system or, to use more traditional
terminology, in the Third World.
Three "mission types" emerged from the discussion, each with
its own problems and prospects: 1) traditional peacekeeping which
usually entails monitoring a cease-fire or implementing a
negotiated settlement; 2) reconstruction of a failed or destroyed
state; and, 3) enforcement actions.
A series of questions will shape future U.S. support for
U.N. operations. When should we care enough about second tier
conflict to put ourselves at risk? How much should we empower the
U.N.? And, is it possible to impose reconstruction on a society
in deep conflict? Clear answers to these questions would simplify
the task of making the U.S. Army a more effective tool for the
support of U.N. operations. Unfortunately, the Army will likely
be called on to assist the U.N. even before the American public
and policymakers frame coherent answers to these vital questions.
The Army will face at least two major dilemmas as it
attempts to increase its proficiency at peace operations. The
first is assuring that this increased proficiency does not come
at the cost of decreased proficiency in other vital areas such as
conventional land warfare. New missions or, at least, new
emphases in a time of declining resources can generate great
dangers. The second dilemma is one that has run throughout what
was once called low-intensity conflict for several decades. The
military in general and the Army in particular have devoted far
and away the most effort to attempting to understand this sort of
conflict and craft coherent responses. Yet the military is, by
definition, a secondary actor standing in support of civilian
agencies. The difficulty is finding ways to share the Army's
accumulated knowledge with the key civilian agencies without
militarizing the problem.

INTRODUCTION
The U.N. After the Cold War: Renaissance or Indian Summer?
Philosophers, statesmen, and victims of conflict have long
dreamed of a world expunged of war. But so long as the
international system was one where power--especially military
power--was decentralized and the constituent units of the system
varied by values, cultures, and perceptions, violence was
endemic. The ultimate solution was obvious but unattainable:
centralize power, delegitimize military force, homogenize values,
and find methods to eradicate misperception. To many, this
implied that peace would only come with world government.
Somewhat less idealistic was what came to be called the liberal
internationalist perspective. First given coherent form in the
essay "On Eternal Peace" by the Enlightenment philosopher
Immanuel Kant, this sought disarmament, greater reliance on
international law, and an international system composed of
constitutional republics.1 Just as civil society emerged out of
anarchy, so too, liberal internationalists hoped, would a more
peaceful and organized international system.
However rational the objectives of the liberal
internationalists were, violence remained a common technique for
adjusting the international power balance and resolving conflicts
between and within states. War was seen as natural, instinctive,
and even noble. Machiavelli and Hobbes rather than Kant were the
patron saints of international politics. But the 20th century
challenged this attitude. Two things in particular gave rise to
the idea that there were alternatives to the war-torn balance of
power. First was the emergence of a vigorous advocate for liberal
internationalism as the United States became a world power.
Woodrow Wilson was a particularly articulate and influential
proponent of the spread of democracy, self-determination, free
trade, and collective security against aggression. Eventually,
American influence and enthusiasm forced even the most jaded
European power to take these alternative ideas seriously. The
second challenge to the traditional balance of power was the
growing destructiveness of war. The Marne, Verdun, Somme,
Tannenberg, Masurian Lakes, and a thousand other battles of World
War I shattered the glory of war and spurred the search for
alternative methods of ordering the international system.
Most leaders recognized that world government was infeasible
or undesirable and favored some less drastic way to homogenize
international values, provide a forum for the peaceful resolution
of conflict, and organize collective security. This notion
spawned the first global international organization designed
explicitly to do these things--the League of Nations. But despite
expectations that the League would revolutionize international
politics, it quickly proved impotent. The Senate refused to allow
the United States to join, so the organization lost its most
fervent patron. With the rise of Soviet Communism, Italian
Fascism, and German Nazism, all hope for the homogenization of

values among the great powers collapsed. This, in combination
with the League's lack of an effective enforcement mechanism,
doomed it. As the world slipped back into global war, the League
of Nations was extant, but useless.
The League's failure to prevent World War II could have been
the death blow of liberal internationalism, but instead, it
emerged from the conflict with new life. Rather than concluding
that the concept of collective security through international
organization was flawed, key world leaders such as Franklin
Roosevelt blamed structural defects in the League of Nations for
its inability to prevent global war. In addition, proponents of
international organization believed that any lingering resistance
was certainly shattered by the horrors of World War II. So, like
the League, the United Nations was designed to provide a forum
for the peaceful resolution of conflict, develop international
law, and, when necessary, implement collective security against
aggression. But in a departure from the structure of the League,
the heart of the U.N. was a Security Council dominated by the
five major wartime allies. This, it was thought, would more
realistically reflect the concentration of power in the
international system while still allowing for an egalitarian
forum in the General Assembly.
In a melancholy repetition of the experience of the League
of Nations, the U.N. very quickly foundered on the hard realities
of global politics. Since it was never intended as a world
government with power greater than its member states, the U.N.
could be no stronger than the willingness of its members to
pursue the peaceful resolution of conflict and collective
security. As the international system was riven by the cold war
and, later, by the series of disagreements between the developed
nations and the Third World known as the "North-South conflict,"
the U.N. weakened. The expectations of liberal internationalists
again remained unfulfilled. The organization's inherent
conceptual weaknesses also became clear. Formed at the end of
World War II, it was designed to deal with traditional
inter-state aggression rather than the type of internal conflict
that dominated the cold war international system. With the
Security Council paralyzed by the cold war and the General
Assembly dominated by what the United States saw as the radical
and unrealistic agenda of the Third World, the U.N. had, by the
1980s, sunk to near impotence. That it played any role at all in
the peaceful resolution of conflict and collective security was
due to extra-Charter innovations by visionaries such as Dag
Hammarskjold and Brian Urquhart. Foremost among these innovations
was peacekeeping.
In the early 1990s, the rapid and unexpected demise of the
Soviet Union appeared to open the way for a renaissance of the
United Nations. The ideological paralysis of the cold war lifted
and, in a wonderful coincidence, the North-South conflict abated
as many Third World nations abandoned authoritarianism and
statism for greater political openness, market economies and, in

some places, elected democracies. The U.N. itself found a
talented and visionary leader in Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali. Suddenly, the U.N. became the centerpiece or
broker for resolution of a bevy of global conflicts; the blue
flag of the organization had never been more conspicuous. For a
brief period, all obstacles to attainment of the dream that drove
the U.N.'s founders seemed surmountable.
Today, the heady euphoria that accompanied the end of the
cold war has faded. Despite Boutros-Ghali's attempts to
invigorate the U.N., it is still more a reflection of the
international system than a force which shapes it. The U.N. is no
stronger than its members will allow, and the end of the cold war
did not eradicate value conflicts, misperceptions, and suspicion
among the nations of the world. In addition, the Charter still
seems inadequate for dealing with the type of internal conflict
that dominated the post-cold war international system. While the
potential of the U.N. seems more attainable than it did 5 years
ago, it is still potential rather than reality. Even the United
States is torn. The fact that the U.N. was created at all and
sustained through the dark days of the cold war was due, in part,
to the U.S.' lingering isolationism. We wanted something other
than ourselves to promote the liberal internationalist vision of
the world, and hoped that the United Nations would do this. But
the traumas of the 1970s and 1980s made many Americans see the
U.N. as a colossal mistake, a Frankenstein's monster turning on
its creator.
Today, the U.N. stands at a crossroad. It is not clear
whether the end of the cold war opened the way for the
organization to finally meet the expectations of its founders, or
whether it is simply dying a loud and demonstrative death. For
the historians of the future, the early 1990s may be seen as
either the renaissance of the United Nations or its Indian
Summer.
The Roundtable.
President Clinton has stated support for greater U.N.
effectiveness in the peaceful resolution of conflict and the
organization of collective security. This entails finding ways to
improve U.N. peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace- enforcement.2
Clearly the U.S. Army will have a vital role in this process and
thus must better understand both the U.N. itself and the key
issues and questions associated with peace operations. To
encourage such understanding, the Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, sponsored a roundtable on October 5, 1993
at Carlisle Barracks, PA. This brought together distinguished
experts from both inside and outside the government. The group
included published authors on the U.N., participants in the
formulation or implementation of U.S. policy toward the U.N.,
veteran peacekeepers, and active analysts of peace operations. (A
participant list is at Appendix A to this report.)

This roundtable examined grand strategic issues such as the
nature of the future international system and the evolving role
of the United Nations. A subsequent roundtable will deal with the
more specific subject of Army involvement in U.N. peace
operations. All discussion was non-attribution to encourage frank
and open debate. To build a foundation for discussion, roundtable
participants received read-ahead material published by the
Strategic Studies Institute. (See the bibliography at Appendix
B.)
The roundtable opened with an introduction of the
recently-formed U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. (A fact sheet
is at Appendix C.) Discussion was then organized around a series
of topics: 1) the future of the international system; 2) the role
of the United Nations in potential future systems; 3) methods for
improving or strengthening the U.N.; and, 4) the compatibility of
U.S. interests and those of the United Nations. The debate that
emerged was often free-wheeling but consistently fecund. The
remainder of this report attempts to capture the essence of the
roundtable, but is not a verbatim transcript.

PROCEEDINGS
The Future of the International System.
The roundtable first dealt with the broadest (and perhaps
most central) question of all: What shape will the post-cold war
international system take and what will be the sources and forms
of conflict within it?3 While it is impossible to answer such a
speculative question with certainty, it is vital to attempt since
the nature of the international system will largely determine the
role and function of the United Nations.
To begin discussion, a participant offered a model of the
future international system based on a two-tier configuration.
The first tier is composed of advanced market democracies
including the European Community, North America, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand. Other states such as the members of
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are on the
edge of the first tier. The first tier is relatively homogenous
in terms of interests and values and is economically
interdependent. In terms of war and peace, first tier states are
the core global actors, but war among them is almost
inconceivable. They prefer stability because stability is good
for business. The United States, as the preeminent core power,
favors collective security as a means of sharing responsibility
for global security, and finds its use of military power limited
primarily by public opinion rather than capability.
The second tier includes all the nations which are not
advanced market democracies, specifically the old Third World and
most of the former Second World or Soviet bloc. The second tier
is much less homogenous than the first, and ranges from nations
which, in terms of economic development, are nearly in the first
tier such as China, to states that have no chance of substantial
development. In contrast to the first tier, there is no
commonality of values in the second tier, and thus this is where
major violence will occur in the future. Most of it will be
internal--"self-determination run amok" as one participant
phrased it. Outside the Persian Gulf and South Asia, traditional
regional conflict is nearly obsolete. Militarily, second tier
states are limited by capability rather than public opinion. No
second tier state can militarily confront a determined first tier
nation. Most importantly, the survival of the system itself
cannot be threatened by instability or violence in the second
tier--a historically unique condition.
The first tier has few truly vital interests in the second
tier with petroleum being the possible exception. This means that
if the United States is to become involved in security problems
in the second tier, we must alter or jettison our traditional
definition of the national interest. Development of the notion of
"humanitarian vital interests" is an attempt to deal with this
dilemma. An additional important issue is how the first tier,

particularly the United States, will interact militarily with the
second tier. One alternative is a modification of the U.N. model
where collective security is pursued through cooperation between
first tier and second tier states. Another is "collective
hegemony" where the first tier imposes its will on the second in
order to promote stability and expand the ring of market
democracies. When the United Nations actively promotes security
in the second tier, first tier states will prefer to use the
Security Council rather than the General Assembly. Potentially,
the second tier may grow to distrust the U.N. as it recognizes
that the organization is used by the first tier to impose its
will or its values. To counter this, second tier states are
seeking greater influence in the Security Council, possibly
through some sort of permanent seat with a veto.
Another participant felt that relations among the first tier
states would not be as cooperative as the author of the two-tier
system suggested. While intra-core differences might not lead to
outright war, they could spark surrogate conflict in the second
tier. He also suggested that a multiple layer rather than a
two-tier configuration might more accurately describe the world.
The core would be composed of the first tier market democracies,
the second layer of the "nearly first tier" states such as India,
Brazil, and China, and, eventually, the outer tier of "failed
states" such as Somalia and Bosnia. In this configuration,
conflict occurs more at the interface of different layers than
within a layer. Security will often be defined as containing
instability and violence within the layer where it emerged.
The author of the two-tier system felt that this
underestimated the autonomy of the first tier and the degree to
which it is united by shared values. This implies a duality in
the international system which a layered "onion" model does not
capture. He did note the possibility of movement from the second
to first tier and suggested that this was the thrust of the new
foreign policy recently outlined by the Clinton administration-to assist nations attempting to join the first tier.
Another participant pointed out that the two-tier model was
essentially governmental or state-centered, and doesn't
adequately account for the security dilemmas of post-colonial
nations that are not truly states. The first tier is not
particularly comfortable dealing with these pseudo-states that
compose much of the second tier of the international system.
American activity in a failed state like Somalia is a perfect
illustration of this. The two-tier model may also underestimate
the growing power of non-state actors. Furthermore, the economic,
political, and security problems of the second tier erode the
ability of the first tier to fully control the extent of its
involvement. Phenomena like migration from the second tier
transform its difficulties into problems for the first tier as
well. As a participant phrased it, "The problems of the second
tier become our problems as their people vote with their feet."
This makes preventive measures such as peacekeeping and economic

development important elements of first tier security, however
politically unpopular they may be. It was also suggested that we
should not overemphasize the military mismatch between first tier
and second tier states since the permeability of first tier
nations makes them vulnerable to unconventional applications of
force such as terrorism. Another participant noted that non-state
groups within the second tier find such unconventional violence
especially attractive, and this can influence the more
conventional application of force by the U.N. or first tier
states.
A participant then reminded the group of the extreme
limitations on the size of the first tier. He was skeptical of
the ability of any of the Asian candidate members to make the
transition. India and China in particular have long histories of
disintegration and reunification. He also noted that it is an
oversimplification to assume that the second tier will be
dominated by violence, and suggested some regions of the second
tier will be quite stable. These would be useful partners for the
first tier in achieving some sort of overall order.
Failed states pose particularly thorny problems for the
emerging post-cold war international system. The American
military in particular has had great difficulty dealing with
societies lacking normal power-wielding institutions such as
governments and legal systems. Cambodia and Somalia are examples,
but the same problem emerged in Lebanon where the United States
became affiliated with an institution calling itself the national
government which really had no power outside a small sector of
Beruit. During military operations in failed states, the United
States searches for formal parallel institutions. This is
especially true for bureaucratic organizations like the military
which are accustomed to clear lines of authority and
responsibility. When we do not find such institutions, we often
attempt to create them. Sometimes this succeeds, but more often
fails. Another participant pointed out that the United States
does, in fact, have doctrine for dealing with societies where
governmental authority has collapsed--counterinsurgency. To date,
however, the process of using counterinsurgency doctrine to build
doctrine for the reconstruction of failed states has not
occurred.
As discussion returned to the two-tier model, its author
reiterated that the current system differs from all its
predecessors in that there is no immediate military activity
which can challenge the system in the way that nuclear war
threatened the cold war international system. Currently, second
tier conflict does not have the potential to ignite conflict
among first tier states. This offers first tier states the option
of eschewing involvement in second tier violence. If first tier
states do become involved in second tier conflict, they will
usually do it cooperatively rather than competitively. Other
participants, however, disagreed with the notion that first tier
states could or should disassociate themselves from second tier

conflict but did not specify the rationale for U.S. involvement
in second tier conflict.
A participant then asked whether the concepts of
unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity were relevant in the
two-tier model of the international system. The author of the
two-tier framework suggested that these concepts were derived
from the traditional, state-centric international system, and
therefore were of limited utility in the post-cold war system.
Another participant noted that unipolarity, bipolarity, and
multipolarity were always used to describe the configuration of
the core of the international system. If there is no conflict
among first tier states, then these concepts are irrelevant. But,
this participant argued, there will be more conflict among first
tier states than predicted by the author of the framework.
A military officer then noted that the extent of cooperation
or conflict within the first tier is a vital determinant of
future U.S. force structure requirements. A military force
designed only to intervene in the second tier would look markedly
different than one also designed or instead designed to fight
other first tier nations. One criticism of the recent "bottom up
review" of the U.S. military is that by focusing on second tier
conflict it ignored the possibility of intra-first tier
violence.4 The author of the two-tier model later argued that the
only reason for building a military force to fight another first
tier nation is if we think one or more of them might revert from
market democracy. War between market democracies, he stressed, is
practically inconceivable. Reversion, however, is at least
possible.
Another participant added that the notion of regionalism as
it is expressed in American strategy doesn't always correspond to
the realities of the world. The inherent weaknesses of regional
organizations, whether formal or informal, give the U.N. a major
role in the maintenance of peace and security almost by default.
The power of regional organizations, according to another
participant, is inversely proportional to the problems in their
region. NATO is strong but Europe is stable; the Organization of
African Unity and the Gulf Cooperation Council are weak and their
regions are unstable. Several participants did, however, feel
that strengthening regional systems is a desirable, if difficult,
objective.
The discussion then returned to the question of whether
violence and instability in the second tier warrants the
attention of the United States. In disagreement with the author
of the two-tier model, a participant argued that the
proliferation of advanced weapons, especially weapons of mass
destruction, makes it very dangerous for the United States to
eschew involvement in second tier conflicts. This, he concluded,
supported preemptive or early involvement in potentially
dangerous second tier conflicts.

In conclusion, the participants generally agreed that the
future international system would be two tiered with most
conflict occurring in the second tier. This will include the
emergence of "failed states." They disagreed on:<R>
• The degree of stability and cooperation within the first
tier;
• The extent to which instability and violence in the second
tier can threaten first tier states, especially the United
States;
• The importance of non-state actors in the system;
• The wisdom or feasibility of attempts to reconstruct
failed states.
On the very vital question of when the United States should
become involved in second tier conflicts, even those participants
in favor of an activist national security strategy did not offer
concrete guidelines for determining which conflicts warranted our
attention. The cold war provided such guidelines: We became
involved when a Third World conflict became a surrogate
superpower struggle or when it had the possibility of leading to
direct superpower confrontation. In the post-cold war system, it
is not yet clear what the criteria should be for the application
of American power. If the potential for humanitarian disaster or
presence of weapons of mass destruction become such criteria,
then nearly every second tier conflict will require American
involvement. Clearly this is at odds with our declining military
force and presence. But while we have not yet clarified the
criteria for engagement, we will not abdicate the right to do so.
The American public will never allow the U.N. to determine the
locale and extent of our engagement in second tier conflict.
In the absence of coherent criteria for engagement, the
tendency is to attempt to preempt or contain every second tier
conflict. If this continues, the result will be strategic
overextension or a serious means/ends mismatch as our commitments
outstrip our capabilities or, at least, our will. Several
participants at the roundtable, in fact, warned of dangers of
overextension. So while a majority of the participants supported
U.S. involvement in second tier conflict--preferably in
preemptive, coalition efforts--they did not agree on coherent
strategic criteria for engagement. We know "how" to become
involved, but have not clarified the "why" and "when." A
participant pointed out that this is due, in part, to the
changing state of global values. Values shape the definition of
national interest, and until we clarify the value structure
underlying our post-cold war strategy, we cannot clearly define
national interest or formulate coherent strategic criteria for
engagement.

The Role of the United Nations.
During discussion of the future international system,
several participants suggested the United Nations was becoming an
agent for the interests of the first tier states. The roundtable
then turned to deal explicitly with the evolving role of the
U.N., especially its ability to promote peace and security.
The first item of discussion was the relationship of the
U.N. and regional organizations. Most participants felt that
regional organizations had an important role to play in the
future international system, but nearly all agreed that they
needed substantial improvement. Until this happens, one
participant noted, the U.N. will be the only viable international
organization for the promotion of peace and security. The U.N.,
in other words, is not actively engaged today so much because of
its effectiveness as because of the ineffectiveness of regional
organizations. It is thus a good substitute for direct
intervention by first tier countries. This might be called
"surrogate hegemony" in contrast to the "collective hegemony" of
direct intervention. A participant reminded the group that the
United Nations has no independent objectives or interests, but is
simply a tool for the attainment of the objectives or interests
of its member states. Thus the role of the United Nations is
whatever the people who pay for it say it is. And, clearly, the
United States is still the most important member state in
determining the role and objectives of the U.N.
The cold war limited U.N. involvement in regional conflicts
but now this brake is released. One participant suggested that
while the U.N. has a vital role to play in international
consensus-building, its does not have the skills to actually
apply force. This will persist despite the urging of people like
Brian Urquhart to upgrade the U.N.'s command and control
capability. It was also pointed out that most proposals for
strengthening the U.N.'s enforcement capability called for only a
small, permanent rapid reaction contingent while the bulk of
peace enforcement forces will remain under national control.5 In
a term used by General (Ret.) John Galvin, the U.N. must
"subcontract" enforcement measures and provide only political
guidance and moral mandate. But, another participant pointed out,
the only regional organization with the capability of handling
such subcontracts is NATO.
A participant then noted that anything that could be done
with a standing U.N. force could be done with earmarked national
units. A standing U.N. brigade, after all, would not solve the
problem of overextension. Nor could it be specialized enough to
serve in all of the types of operations where a U.N. presence is
required.
Currently the U.N. cannot command and control even a limited
standing force. The major institutional shortcoming of the U.N.,

a participant argued, is that the highest decision- making body-the Security Council--does not have a permanent structure for
military advice. The Military Staff Committee is ineffective.
While the national representatives on the Security Council
receive military advice from their national armed forces, the
Secretary-General has no independent source of information or
guidance. As an ad hoc solution, the Secretary-General tends to
solicit military advice (and intelligence) from the United States
and other Western states. A permanent U.N. military staff would
solve this problem. But, this participant felt, even a U.N. with
better military advice and intelligence should not attempt
anything other than small-scale military operations. A
strengthened U.N. could handle operations like Somalia but major
enforcement operations such as Desert Storm require the more
advanced staff and intelligence systems of its member states.
It was then suggested that discussions of a robust U.N.
military capability may not capture the true essence of the
peacekeeping problem, since so much of the work in such
operations is actually civilian. Furthermore, the U.N. is fully
capable of deploying and controlling some of the most valuable
types of peacekeepers, especially truce and election monitors,
mediators, and civilian police. The U.N. can be effective in
situations were antagonists in a conflict have fought to the
point of exhaustion and genuinely want outside assistance. Thus
the roundtable participants generally supported actions to
improve the Secretary-General's effectiveness in these more
traditional functions.
Since most participants rejected the notion of major changes
in the structure of the U.N., discussion focused on methods for
enhancing the effectiveness of the organization within existing
parameters. Paramount among these is better horizontal
integration of the various organizations involved in operations
like Somalia which combine peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.
In these, coordination tends to be informal and
personality-dependent. A participant with in-depth knowledge of
the Somalia operation noted that it was the military that was
most persistent in tying together all the disparate relief and
development agencies. He proposed something like a "country team"
concept to synchronize efforts. The proposals of Boutros-Ghali,
according to another participant, would empower the U.N. to take
actions that are relatively inexpensive and do not require robust
military force. The reinstatement of lapsed cease-fires and
promotion of political solutions are activities appropriate for
the U.N. The problem is that few conflicts are amenable to this
type of solution. National contingents must continue to deal with
conflicts that require robust military forces. The group was
reminded, though, that even standing U.N. forces would remain
under national commanders--the Secretary-General would not have
actual military command. If the force commander exceeded the
terms of reference established for the operation and accepted by
the participating nations, then a national contingent commander
would have the right to disagree and inform the force commander

that he cannot obey.
As the discussion returned to the grand strategic level, a
participant suggested that since relations between the first and
second tiers of the international system will not be amicable in
the future, the U.N., which reflects this division, may
disintegrate rather than increase in effectiveness. One of the
major determinants of how fast this collapse occurs will be the
leadership skills of the secretaries-general who follow
Boutros-Ghali. The current selection method for the
Secretary-General does not lend itself to the emergence of
effective and dynamic leaders. Another participant suggested that
rather than the collapse of the U.N., we are simply witnessing
the testing and definition of its limits. Once we discover what
it can and cannot do, its functions can be clarified. In fact,
commonality and cooperation between the first and second tiers is
growing, thus giving multinational bodies a more important role
to play rather than a lesser one.
In conclusion, most participants were skeptical of the sort
of new U.N. activities proposed by Boutros-Ghali, Urquhart, and
others. There was a feeling that the U.N. does traditional
peacekeeping activities fairly well, but would meet with much
less success if it attempted to undertake operations requiring a
robust military capability. While nearly all participants agreed
that the U.N. should improve its ability to control peace
operations, they were critical of plans for standing military
forces or military staffs. The participants did not agree as to
whether the U.N. is currently experiencing a renaissance or an
Indian Summer.
Strengthening the U.N.?
The roundtable participants offered a number of suggestions
for strengthening the United Nations. They concluded that this
must be from the "bottom up." Rather than looking first to
development of the capability for military enforcement, the U.N.
should focus on the minimum necessary structural, political, and
economic changes to deal effectively and in a timely fashion with
traditional peacekeeping. Such improvements would come in the
areas of force recruitment, supply of fielded forces, and
transportation. The U.N. should also seek to enhance its "peace
building" capabilities by developing better methods to recruit,
train, and field competent electoral observers, civil
administrators, and civilian police. There should also be a
limited planning and support staff within the U.N. Secretariat.
This should be entirely separate from the sort of command and
logistics staff required for large-scale military operations.
Another participant noted that the real weakness of the U.N.
is at the nexus of the economic, political, and military elements
of power. Cases such as Cambodia or Somalia show that the
integration of diverse capabilities when "standing up" failed
states is a topic in dire need of further work, study, and

analysis. In Cambodia, the United Nations "stumbled into success"
rather than "organizing for success." 6 In Somalia, the problem
has not been so much a failure in the application of military
force (although this has occurred) as a failure of the political,
economic, and diplomatic process of reestablishing civil society
and government. While the reconstruction of failed states may not
be the most common form of U.N. operations in the future, it will
be among the most difficult.
Another participant further stressed the secondary role of
the military in peacekeeping and civil reconstruction operations.
The way you exit the military, he argued, is to have a coherent
political strategy. That has been missing in recent operations.
And, another participant added, it is important to note that the
civil affairs units in the Army are not suited to this. Unlike
the World War II era, they are not designed to reestablish
government, order, and administration after fighting has
subsided. Another participant stated that the primary function of
Army civil affairs was support of Third World developmental
projects. It should be added that while the doctrinal roles and
missions of Army civil affairs units could allow them to play an
important role in reconstruction of failed states, their location
in the reserve component complicates the sort of sustained effort
that such reconstruction would demand.7 And unfortunately, the
U.S.' past experience at reconstruction is not applicable to
situations such as Somalia. At the end of World War II, the
governments, economies, and militaries of Germany and Japan were
destroyed, but their societies were intact. This is not true in
Somalia where we are attempting to socially engineer in 2 years
something that has fallen apart over decades or perhaps was never
there.
A participant noted that there is no clear foundation in the
Charter of the United Nations for operations entailing the
reconstruction of failed states. But, according to another,
nearly all U.N. activity in civil conflict violates the Charter
prohibition against involvement in the internal affairs of member
states. Another participant asserted that the political and civil
elements of the United Nations have usually been well prepared
for traditional peacekeeping operations which occur when the
actual combat has subsided. They are not prepared to perform
their functions in the midst of fighting. The result is a
circular deadlock where the civilian agencies claim that they
cannot continue their activities until order is fully restored
and the military claims that it cannot complete its mission
without the public support that would be generated by the civil
activities.
Because of the U.N.'s aversion to the use of force, it does
not make the most effective use of certain military assets such
as civil affairs and psychological operations units. The attitude
in the U.N. has traditionally been "un-Clausewitzean" in that
military force, rather than being an integral adjunct of
political efforts, was only used when diplomacy failed and then

stopped as soon as diplomacy could be reinvigorated. (This same
charge has long been leveled against American statecraft so the
delinkage of force and diplomacy in the U.N. may, in part,
reflect American influence over that organization's institutional
culture.) Militaries must accept this situation and limit
themselves to providing security, transportation, and logistic
support while the political organizations bear the brunt of
responsibility for actually resolving conflicts.
The absence of an effective military headquarters system
also hinders U.N. operations. Any decision which the force
commander cannot make on his own is referred to the Security
Council through the Secretary-General's special representative.
There it is often bogged down in political debate. For the
application of military power under the Charter, a participant
argued, there is a need for some sort of intermediate
organization to pass guidance downward and information upward.
Discussion then focused on the diversity between the
institutional culture of the civilian U.N. secretariat and that
of the military force which participates in peace operations.
These can be exacerbated when member states experience military
coups and by interservice rivalries within member states.
A more skeptical participant questioned the basic premise of
strengthening the U.N. He was especially critical of attempting
to reconstruct failed states. The U.N. will become no more
effective, he argued, than the United States allows. As Somalia
disintegrates, the American public may well lose confidence in
the U.N., thus ending its renewed importance. The reconstruction
of failed states or those emerging from long conflicts, according
to another participant, is more the function of the various U.N.
specialized agencies than that of the Secretary-General and his
immediate staff. For example, the distribution of food during
reconstruction and relief operations is not handled by the
Secretary General or the Security Council. But the U.N. has never
been able to effectively coordinate economic and social
activities or control the civilian organs which largely determine
the ultimate success or failure of an operation. Both the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Administrative
Committee on Coordination have tried and failed. So the core
problem is more than a "two culture" one pitting military and
civilian institutions, but is a "multi-culture" one where stark
differences in attitudes and perspectives exist between the
civilian agencies of the U.N. as well as between the U.N. and
nongovernmental relief groups (NGOs).
A participant countered that it is possible to discern the
embryo of such coordination in the Cambodia operation. This
reflected the "lead agency" concept. The first participant felt,
however, that this does partially address some of the short-term
problems like food relief and the holding of elections, but not
the long-term ones such as constructing a self-sustaining
economy. It is especially difficult for the Secretary General to
coordinate NGOs since there are about 124 of them involved in

Cambodia and 225 in Bosnia. Such coordination tends to take place
informally in the field. Another participant noted that there are
methods for encouraging NGOs to participate in efforts at
coordination since the U.N. and the U.S. Agency for International
Development funnel money to many of them. Another participant
argued that these coordination problems and the lack of
institutional solutions make the selection of participants in a
U.N. operation, whether the Special Representative or the actual
military units, all the more vital. The personalities of the
participants, in other words, often becomes a vital determinant
of success.
It was pointed out that making the U.N. more efficient at
the type of operations that it has traditionally undertaken is
radically different from the more extreme proposals which call
for making it capable of new kinds of activities such as military
enforcement. From this perspective, one way to strengthen the
U.N. is to simply not encourage it or allow it to take on
missions beyond its inherent limitations. The goal, then, would
be to seek enhanced efficiency rather than augmented
effectiveness. The ability to assess missions may also be a
crucial skill for the U.N. This, according to another
participant, is the position of the Clinton administration--that
the U.N. "has to learn to say No." The U.N. must develop a
tradition, as other participants suggested, of occasionally
letting conflicts rage until conditions for resolution are ripe.
This argument, however, implies that the U.N. can select
between involvement or noninvolvement in a conflict much like a
nation. It is not clear that this is a realistic option since the
U.N. is almost forced into global activism by tradition and by
political imperatives. It is the U.N.'s birthright to at least
attempt to solve all conflicts. In "significant states," meaning
ones skilled at playing to world public opinion, restraint could
only occur if the permanent members of the Security Council chose
to limit U.N. activity to the sort of operations where it stood a
high chance of success.8 In fact, the United States is currently
attempting to force the Security Council to clarify the
conditions for both entrance and exit before engagement in a
conflict. But if the U.N., at the urging of a permanent member of
the Security Council, does "say no" to engagement in a conflict,
this would place responsibility for the conflict directly on the
shoulders of that permanent member. In the end, the permanent
member would rather see the U.N. try and then fail to solve a
conflict than shoulder the onus for a disaster unfolding on the
television screens of the world.
In addition, another participant pointed out, the sort of
conflicts which most demand U.N. attention are those where armed
violence is simply a symptom of deeper problems of
underdevelopment and the absence of a functioning civil society.
The U.N.'s record in helping make the sort of fundamental
political, economic, and social changes involved in nation
assistance is not propitious. This leads to the conundrum that

the U.N. is really only capable of dealing with the type of
problems where its involvement is not vital. The systemically
responsible step, according to a participant, may be for the U.N.
to actually take over and administer failed states. But that, of
course, smacks of colonialism, and would therefore be
unacceptable to most second tier states--the people on which a
U.N.-engineered order is imposed quickly become "something less
than grateful." Phrased differently, the second tier was a great
proponent of the U.N. when it saw the organization as a bulwark
against the imposition of the will of a first tier focused on the
cold war, but now that the U.N. may be becoming an agent for the
imposition of first tier interests, the second tier is
increasingly suspicious.
Even in operations such as Somalia, the nature of global
information flows complicates the U.N.'s task. The group was
reminded that outside south Mogadishu, the Somalia operation was
quite successful. But because media coverage focuses on violence
in Mogadishu, public support for the operation in the United
States has crumbled. The U.N. is simply not very effective at
mobilizing support for its activities. But, it might be added,
any attempt to sway public opinion by the U.N. would probably
meet intense resistance by the governments of member states.
The United States and the United Nations.
The roundtable participants then turned to the question of
the compatibility of U.S. national security interests with the
ongoing evolution of the U.N. A participant noted that we tend to
throw issues to the U.N. that we prefer not get involved with
directly. As a superpower, we feel some degree of global
responsibility, yet as a superpower with no imperial ambitions
and a long isolationist tradition, we find many problems where
our concern is far below the threshold of effective action. The
U.N. thus moves problems away from our own front door.
Another participant noted that there will be times when
cooperation with the U.N. is in our national interest, and there
will be other times when divergent perspectives between
Washington and the U.N. lead us to ignore or bypass the
organization. This participant argued that the compatibility of
U.S. and U.N. interests will depend, in part, on the activism of
the Secretary General. To the extent the Secretary General rather
than the Security Council frames the U.N.'s agenda, the U.N. will
be less a tool of American policy and more an autonomous actor in
world politics. So long as primary decision-making power remains
with the Security Council, the interests of the United States and
U.N. will largely remain compatible.
After all, according to another participant, it was
Boutros-Ghali who put Somalia on the world political agenda to
fulfill a promise made to African leaders during his bid for the
Secretary-Generalship. When Boutros-Ghali failed to gain support

within the chambers of the Security Council, he took his case to
the public. The United States was then pressured to participate
in the operation even given our minimal or nonexistent national
interests. We saw Somalia as strategically insignificant, but an
apparently easy operation, so we became involved in order to help
establish a precedent of activism and success. In Bosnia, which
was strategically significant, we anticipated limited chances of
success, and thus eschewed involvement. Symbolism and the
establishment of precedent as much as national interest in the
traditional sense are shaping our national security strategy.
The connection was then made between the declining size of
the U.S. military and the United Nations. The implication was
that a more active and robust U.N. could shoulder some of the
responsibilities that the United States might be forced to
abdicate. This could be called the "junior partner" approach
since it assumes that U.N. objectives are generally compatible
with those of the United States. Another participant warned that
the Somalia operation might deplete the support of the American
people for the use of military force in general, and thus place
us in a dangerous position should a real threat arise.
A participant then argued that the roundtable had largely
ignored American public opinion during the day's discussion.
Public support, he felt, was a vital component of U.S. relations
with the United Nations. Problems arise from widespread public
distrust of the U.N. left from the dark days of the 1970s and
1980s. In a broader sense, he felt that the American public had
not been convinced that any U.N. peace operation was worth
placing American servicemen at risk. Evidence of this can been
seen in Congress' growing reluctance to fund peace operations.9
In the face of this trend, the Clinton administration seems to
have lowered its enthusiasm for peace operations rather than
attempted to mobilize support for it. But another participant
argued that the humanitarian urge in the American public is an
important force. It might not be powerful enough to sustain a
long, costly military operation, but could generate approval for
the initial involvement in places like Somalia. In a sense, the
President's role is to sustain public support more than to
mobilize it.
A participant then placed the question of the compatibility
of U.S. and U.N. interests within the context of the new American
strategy as explained by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake.
This strategy is to replace containment--a defensive grand
strategy--with enlargement of the community of market
democracies. By contrast, this is a proactive or offensive grand
strategy. This could come into conflict with the traditional
American desire to avoid seeming imperialist or to forestall
imposing our will on other states. The implication is that the
U.N. can reconcile these divergent desires. But, another
participant countered, part of the normative basis of the United
Nations is respect for diversity rather than systemic
homogeneity. Our new national security strategy runs counter to

the fundamental principles under which the U.N. was established.
Other participants noted, however, that the normative basis of
the U.N. is undergoing fundamental change. Somalia and other
operations violated the principle of nonintervention in domestic
affairs. Boutros-Ghali, as a prime proponent of a new, more
limited notion of national sovereignty, is contributing to this
normative change.
The U.N. has traditionally sought at least the appearance of
strict neutrality (with some stark exceptions such as Israel and
South Africa). When the organization did takes sides as in the
Congo crisis, it made enemies and lost the veil of neutrality.
This may again be the outcome if Boutros-Ghali's vision of a more
active and interventionist U.N. bears fruit. By seeking to expand
its functions, the U.N. may lose the ability to perform its
traditional missions in peace operations.
For the United States, the U.N. allows burden-sharing and
gives us the opportunity to lead politically but not necessarily
militarily, at least in traditional style peacekeeping. Another
participant suggested that it might be useful for the U.N. to
perform an operation without a U.S. role in order to better gauge
the usefulness of our contribution. The first participant was
skeptical of such an operation's chances of success. But, it was
pointed out, the member states actually have an interest in
preventing the U.N. from becoming too efficient or the
Secretary-General too powerful lest they lose control of the
organization. This participant disagreed with the earlier
contention that Boutros-Ghali had a substantial impact on U.S.
policy toward Somalia. Whenever the United States wanted to
ignore the Secretary-General, he argued, it did so. As another
participant noted, top Clinton policymakers have made clear that
multilateralism is a means, not an end in itself. It was then
argued that deciding how much authority to transfer to the United
Nations is one of the key decisions that will define the
post-cold war U.S. foreign policy. It is possible that we may
find ourselves facing a Secretary-General strengthened
inadvertently through the accretion of a number of apparently
minor policy decisions.
In conclusion, the roundtable participants generally
anticipated a fair degree of compatibility between U.S. and U.N.
objectives, and felt that the U.N. could play an important role
in American national security strategy as we attempt to avoid a
strategic ends/means mismatch. They agreed that gauging the
extent to which we wanted to strengthen the U.N. was a vital
foreign policy decision, but one on which no clear consensus
currently exists. What they did not discuss in great detail was
the fact that such compatibility can and perhaps will erode the
influence of the U.N. in the second tier. Saddam Hussein
attempted to picture the U.N. as the stooge of the United States.
In the future, this perspective may become widespread in the
second tier. If so, the United States will be forced to choose
between a U.N. with limited utility which we control, or a more

influential but autonomous organization.
Conclusion: Issues and Questions.
Since the founding of the United Nations, Americans have
viewed it in many ways. On one end of the spectrum were the
skeptics who saw the organization as useless at best and, at
worst, an outright threat pushing toward world government. This
position was most common on the right side of the political
spectrum and given its most coherent expression by scholars
associated with the Heritage Foundation. The other pole was
populated by those who considered the U.N. a panacea for
international conflict. These thinkers, who usually came from the
left side of the political spectrum, agreed that the U.N. was the
first step toward world government, but considered that a
beneficial thing.
All of the participants at our roundtable were moderates who
fell somewhere between these extremes. All saw at least some
degree of utility in the United Nations, but none considered it a
panacea. Some were fairly skeptical of the U.N.'s utility, others
more optimistic. In this the participants probably reflected the
American public as a whole. The U.N., as the participants
continually reiterated, is a microcosm of the international
system and thus can be no stronger than the broader techniques
for the resolution of conflict and the values that undergird
them. There was deep agreement that most efforts of the U.N. in
the promotion of peace and security would continue to take place
in the second tier of the international system or, to use more
traditional terminology, in the Third World.
Three "mission types" emerged from the discussion, each with
its own problems and prospects. First were what can be called
traditional U.N. peacekeeping which usually entailed monitoring a
cease-fire or implementing a negotiated settlement. This occurs
with the consent of the antagonists, and the actual peacekeeping
operation is secondary to the diplomatic and political processes
that led toward resolution of the conflict. This mission type
first coalesced in the Middle East and was largely the creation
of Dag Hammarskjold and Brian Urquhart. The participants at the
roundtable generally agreed that the U.N. was fairly good at
this. There are problems with overextension and funding as well
as the need for some structural reforms in pursuit of greater
efficiency, but the prospects for success are good and the United
States should support this type of activity.
The second mission type entailed guardianship of a nascent
state as in the Congo operation or reconstruction of a failed or
destroyed state as in Somalia. In such efforts, there are major
problems including the difficulty of coordinating diverse
organizations, expense, a lack of patience and persistence, and,
most of all, the absolute magnitude of the task, especially when
the process of reconstruction was imposed. There is no good

historical precedent for the imposed reconstruction of a failed
or destroyed state. Furthermore, the fact that reconstruction of
a failed or destroyed state smacks of Western colonialism can
generate resistance within the target state and in the Third
World in general. Thus the prospects for U.N. success at
reconstruction are not good.
The third mission type includes enforcement actions such as
Korea or the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. The recent literature
on the U.N. has dealt extensively with peace-enforcement and has
resulted in a number of plans for a standing U.N. military force
or, at a minimum, substantial improvements in the ability of the
Secretary General to command and control large military forces.
It is likely that the participants at the roundtable considered
these passing fads, and would have concluded that future
large-scale enforcement actions will follow the Desert Storm
model where U.N. political approval adds legitimacy to military
actions taken by the United States or a coalition led by the
United States or the other first tier nations.
What emerged from the roundtable, then, was a series of
strategic issues and unanswered questions that will shape future
U.S. support for U.N. operations. When should we care enough
about second tier conflict to put ourselves at risk? How much
should we empower the U.N.? And, is it possible to impose
reconstruction on a society in deep conflict? Clear answers to
these questions would simplify the task of making the U.S. Army a
more effective tool for the support of U.N. operations.
Unfortunately, the Army will likely be called on to assist the
U.N. even before the American public and policymakers frame
coherent answers to these vital questions.
The Army will face at least two major dilemmas as it
attempts to increase its proficiency at peace operations. The
first is assuring that this increased proficiency does not come
at the cost of decreased proficiency in other vital areas such as
conventional land warfare. New missions or, at least, new
emphases in a time of declining resources can generate great
dangers. The second dilemma is one that has run throughout what
was once called low-intensity conflict for several decades. The
military in general and the Army in particular have devoted far
and away the most effort to attempting to understand this sort of
conflict and craft coherent responses. Yet the military is, by
definition, a secondary actor standing in support of civilian
agencies. The problem then, is finding ways to share the Army's
accumulated knowledge with the key civilian agencies without
militarizing the problem. Specific solutions to these two key
dilemmas await discovery.
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